We consider the reliability analysis of phased-mission systems with common-cause failures in this paper. Phased-mission systems (PMS) are systems supporting missions characterized by multiple, consecutive, and nonoverlapping phases of operation. System components may be subject to different stresses as well as different reliability requirements throughout the course of the mission. As a result, component behavior and relationships may need to be modeled differently from phase to phase when performing a system-level reliability analysis. This consideration poses unique challenges to existing analysis methods. The challenges increase when common-cause failures (CCF) are incorporated in the model. CCF are multiple dependent component failures within a system that are a direct result of a shared root cause, such as sabotage, flood, earthquake, power outage, or human errors. It has been shown by many reliability studies that CCF tend to increase a system's joint failure probabilities and thus contribute significantly to the overall unreliability of systems subject to CCF.
INTRODUCTIONINTRODUCTION
A phased-mission system (PMS) is a system that is used in a mission characterized by multiple, consecutive, and non-overlapping operational phases. A classic example of a PMS is an aircraft flight, which involves take-off, ascent, level flight, descent, and landing phases. During each phase of the mission the system has to accomplish a specified (usually different) task, and may be subject to different stresses as well as different reliability requirements.
Thus, system configuration, success/failure criteria, and component failure parameters may change from phase to phase. Also, statistical dependencies exist across the phases for a given component. For example, the state of a component in the beginning of a new phase is identical to its state at the end of the previous phase. The consideration of these dynamics and dependencies poses unique challenges to existing analysis methods. The challenges increase when common-cause failures (CCF) are incorporated in the model. CCF are multiple dependent component failures within a system that are a direct result of a shared root cause, such as sabotage, flood, earthquake, power outage, or human errors [HOYL94) . It has been shown by many reliability studies that CCF tend to increase a system's joint failure probabilities and tbus contribute significantly to the overall unreliability of systems subject to CCF [VAUR98] . Considerable research efforts bave been expended in the study of CCF for reliability modeling and analysis of computer-based systems; see, for example, [AMAR99, DA104, FLEM86, PHAM93, TANG05, VAUR98, VAUR03, XING03, XING05]. However, the existing CCF models are mainly applicable to non-PMS systems. They also have various limitations, such as being concerned with a specific system structure [see, for example, PHAM93); applicable only to systems with exponential time-to-failure distributions [see, for example, FLEM86); being subject to combinatorial explosion as the redundancy level of tbe system increases [see, for example, DAI04]; limiting analysis to components belonging to at most a single commoncause group (CCG) [TANG05, VAUR98); having a single common cause (CC) that affects all components of a system [see, for example, AMAR99, PHAM93); or defining CC as being statistically-independent or mutually exclusive [see, for example, VAUR03]. We seeked to address some of these limitations in developing a model for the reliability analysis of PMS subject to CCF by allowing for multiple CC that can affect different subsets of system components, and which can occur statistically-dependently in our recent work [XING03] . But [XING03) considered PMS with only static phases, in which the failure criteria depend only on the combination of component failures. In reality, however, most phased-mission systems are composed of both static and dynamic phases. A phase is a dynamic phase if any of the following behaviors occur in that phase: components are functionally independent, meaning that the failure of a component forces several other components to fail; coldlwarmlhot spare components are utilized [DUGAOI) ; the order in which failures occur matters, for example, consider a standby system with one active component and one standby spare connected with a switch controller. If the switch controller fails after the active component fails and thus the standby component is already in use, the system can continue to work. However, if the switch controller fails before the active component fails, the standby component cannot be switched into active operation and thus the entire system fails [DUGAOI] . Therefore, existing methods must be modified and/or extended so that the PMS dynamics, dependencies across the phases for a given component, functional dependencies, order of failures, and spare management can be addressed at the same time. We present one such extension to dynamic fault tree analysis in this paper. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents some background on the existing phasemodular fault tree approach to the reliability analysis of PMS with both static and dynamic phases. Section 3 presents a separable phase-modular approach to the reliability analysis of PMS subject to CCF. The approach is illustrated using a hypothetical PMS subject to different CCF depending mission phases. In Section 4 we apply this approach to a space mission example. In the last section, we present our conclusions as well as directions for future work.
THE PHASE·MODULAR APPROACH
Reliability analysis of PMS bas been the subject of considerable research interest. Traditional approaches are either combinatorial or Markov-chain based. The combinatorial approaches, one example of which is the binary decision diagrams (BDD) based approach [XING02, ZANG99) , are computationally efficient, but are applicable only to PMS with static phases. Markov based approaches can capture the dynamic behaviors such as functional dependencies among components, required order of failures, or spare management using Markov-chain models. But the major limitation with Markov based approaches is that if the failure criteria in only one phase are dynamic, then a Markov approach must be used for every phase. Due to the well-known state explosion problem of Markov approaches, it is often computationally intensive and even infeasible to solve the model.
Since cornbinatorial approaches and Markov approaches both have their pros and cons in the system modeling and analyzing, a phase-modular fault tree approach employng both combinatorial binary decision diagram and Markov-chain solution methods as appropriate was proposed [MESHOO, MESH03, OU021 . This approach identifies modules of the fault trees that remain independent throughout the phase mission. It then finds the reliability of each independent module in each phase with an appropriate technique and combines the modules in a system level BDD to find the PMS reliability measures. Next we outline the basic elements of the phase-modular approach using a simple example PMS, which has three phases and eight components (Figure 1, adapted from MESH03 ). Represent each mission phase by a fault tree. Because the reliability of a PMS is the probability that the mission successfully achieves its objectives in all phases, we link the phase fault trees with an OR gate to obtain the entire PMS fault tree. The fault tree for each phase is then divided into independent subtrees. Subtrees are identified as static or dynamic in different phases depending on their characteristics. For example, consider the PMS fault tree in Figure 1 , the phase-one fault tree includes two main modules, (A, G, B, F} and {C, D}, which are both static. The phase-two fault tree includes one static module {A, B, F), and one dynamic module (C, El. The phase-three fault tree includes two static modules {A, G ) , {B}, and one dynamic module {C, D, E, H).
2.
Find the system-level independent modules. This identification is accomplished by finding the unions of the components in all the phase modules that overlap in at least one component. 
4.
Identify each phase module as bottom-level (has no child modules) or upper-level (has child modules).
For example, The module (C, D} in phase one is a bottom level module, and the module {A, G, B, F)
is an upper level module since it contains the child modules {A, GI and {B, F) which are each linked to a gate. The identification of child and parent modules is vital information used in solving for these modules' reliability measure.
5.
Find the joint phase module probabilities for all system-level modules. Copyright O #### by ASME Since combinatorial approaches and Markov approaches both have their pros and cons in the system modeling and analyzing, a phase-modular fault tree approach employing both combinatorial binary decision diagram and Markov-chain solution methods as appropriate was proposed [ME SHOO, MESH03, OU02] . This approach identifies modules of the fault trees that remain independent throughout the phase mission. It then finds the reliability of each independent module in each phase with an appropriate technique and combines the modules in a system level BDD to find the PMS reliability measures. Next we outline the basic elements of the phase-modular approach using a simple example PMS, which has three phases and eight components ( Figure I Represent each mission phase by a fault tree. Because the reliability of a PMS is the probability that the mission successfully achieves its objectives in all phases, we link the phase fault trees with an OR gate to obtain the entire PMS fault tree. The fault tree for each phase is then divided into independent subtrees. Subtrees are identified as static or dynamic in different phases depending on their characteristics. For example, consider the PMS fault tree in Figure I , the phase-one fault tree includes two main modules, {A, G, B, F} and {C, D}, which are both static. The phase-two fault tree includes one static module {A, B, F}, and one dynamic module {C, E}. The phase-three fault tree includes two static modules {A, G}, {B}, and one dynamic module {C, D, E, H}.
2.
Find the system-level independent modules. This identification is accomplished by finding the unions of the components in all the phase modules that overlap in at least one component. There are two system-level independent modules, {A, G, B, F} and {C, D, E, H} in our example PMS fault tree. 3.
Identify each phase module as static (all AND, OR, andlor K-OF-M gates) or dynamic (has at least one PAND, CSP, WSP, or HSP gate). For example, the module {A, G, B, F} is static and {C, D, E, H} is dynamic.
4.
Identify each phase module as bottom-level (has no child modules) or upper-level (has child modules). For example, The module {C, D} in phase one is a bottom level module, and the module {A, G, B, F} is an upper level module since it contains the child modules {A, G} and {B, F} which are each linked to a gate. The identification of child and parent modules is vital information used in solving for these modules' reliability measure.
5.
Find the joint phase module probabilities for all system-level modules. We use the BDD method [XING02, ZANG99} on modules that are static across all the phases. We use the combined Markov chain method as presented in [MESHOO, OU02} on modules with at least one dynamic property. For the example PMS in Figure I , we can use the BDD method on phase module {A, G, B, F} since it has static behavior in all the three phases. We must use the Markov chain method on phase module {C, D, E, H) since it has dynamic behavior in both phase 2 (a priority AND gate) and phase 3(a FDEP gate).
6.
Consider each module a basic event of a static fault tree and solve the corresponding BDD to find the system reliability equation based on the reliability measures of the modules. Since we've already solved for the reliability measures of the modules in step 5, this step concludes the solution. Figure 2 shows the modularized fault tree for the example PMS. Basically, each module's reliability is solved independent of the other modules, but with consideration of its own behavior in previous phases. For instance, in order to find the reliability of MI?, we use a combined BDD approach for M I , and Mlz; in order to find the reliability of M23, we use the combined Markov chain approach on M2,, M22, and M23. We then consider solving the static PMS fault tree with the basic events M I l , M2,, M12, M22, MI,, and M23 using the combined BDD approach and the reliability measures for each individual phase module computed from previous steps. It is important to note that solving this simple PMS fault tree without using the modularization technique would involve solving a Markov chain with approximately 256 states, while the Markov chain involved in this example has a maximum of only 16 states. The phase-modular approach provides exact reliability measures in an efficient manner. In the next section, we present a separable approach based on the efficient phase-modular approach to the reliability analysis of PMS subject to dependent common-cause failures. 
General assumptions and our PMS CCF model
We make the following general assumptions for the CCF analysis in the PMS: 1. Component failures are statistically independent within each phase. 2.
Phase durations are deterministic. 3.
The system is not maintained during the mission: once a component has failed, it remains failed for all later phases.
4.
PMS can be subject to CCF due to different elementary common-causes occurring within a phase or in different phases. In general, we express the elementary common-causes (CC) existing in a PMS as:
Copyright O #### by ASME static behavior in all the three phases. We must use the Markov chain method on phase module {C, D, E, H} since it has dynamic behavior in both phase 2 (a priority AND gate) and phase 3(a FDEP gate). 6.
Consider each module a basic event of a static fault tree and solve the corresponding BDD to find the system reliability equation based on the reliability measures of the modules. Since we've already solved for the reliability measures of the modules in step 5, this step concludes the solution. Figure 2 shows the modularized fault tree for the example PMS. Basically, each module's reliability is solved independent of the other modules, but with consideration of its own behavior in previous phases. For instance, in order to find the reliability of M1 2 , we use a combined BDD approach for MIl and M1 2 ; in order to find the reliability of M2 3 , we use the combined Markov chain approach on M2" M2" and M2,. We then consider solving the static PMS fault tree with the basic events MI" M2t, M1 2 , M2 2 , M1 3 , and M23 using the combined BDD approach and the reliability measures for each individual phase module computed from previous steps. It is important to note that solving this simple PMS fault tree without using the modularization technique would involve solving a Markov chain with approximately 256 states, while the Markov chain involved in this example has a maximum of only 16 states. The phase-modular approach provides exact reliability measures in an efficient manner. In the next section, we present a separable approach based on the efficient phase-modular approach to the reliability analysis ofPMS subject to dependent common-cause failures. 
SEPARABLE PHASE-MODULAR APPROACH

General assumptions and our PMS CCF model
The system is not maintained during the mission: once a component has failed, it remains failed for all later phases. 4.
PMS can be subject to CCF due to different elementary common-causes occurring within a phase or in different phases. In general, we express the elementary common-causes (CC) existing in a PMS as: 
.
Different common causes, whether from the same phase or from different phases can be mutually exclusive, or s-independent, or s-dependent (s denotes statistically).
6.
A component may be affected by nlultiple conlmon causes, that is, one single component can belong to more than one common-cause group (CCG). All components that are caused to fail due to the same elementary common-cause CC,, constitute a common-cause group CCG,,.
An illustrating example
To illustrate the basics and advantages of the proposed separable phase-modular approach, we incorporate the following hypothetical scenario about CCF into the example PMS described in Figure I : the system is subject to CCF from hurricanes (denoted by CCIl) during the first phase, from lightning strikes (denoted by CC?,) during the 
A separable approach to incorporating CCF
We propose an efficient separable approach for incorporating the effects of CCF into the reliability evaluation of PMS in this section. Our methodology is to decompose an original PMS reliability problem with CCF into a number of reduced reliability problems based on the Total Probability Theorem. The set of reduced problems does not have to consider dependencies introduced by CCF, because the effects of CCF have been factored out. And the problems can be solved using the phase-modular approach [MESH03] . Finally, the results of all reduced reliability problems are aggregated to obtain the entire PMS reliability measure considering the CCF.
Specifically, based on our CCF model for PMS, there exist totally L elementary CC in a PMS. The L CC partition the event space into the following 2' disjoint subsets, each called a common-cause event (CCE): CC7E2, = CC', , n n CC,,, n n CC,,,, n . n TCmLb .
Copyright G #### by ASME A component may be affected by multiple common causes, that is, one single component can belong to more than one common-cause group (CCG). All components that are caused to fail due to the same elementary common-cause eel constitute a common-cause group CeG/;_
An illustrating example
To illustrate the basics and advantages of the proposed separable phase-modular approach, we incorporate the following hypothetical scenario about CCF into the example PMS described in Figure I : the system is subject to CCF from hurricanes (denoted by CCII) during the first phase, from lightning strikes (denoted by CC'I) during the second phase, and from floods (denoted by CC 3I ) during the last phase. A liurricane of sufficient intensity in Phase I would cause components A and C to fail, that is, cecil::::: {A;, C 1 }, where A] is the state indicator variable of component A in Phase 1, and ~ denotes the failure of component A in Phase 1; serious lightning strikes in Phase 2 would cause B, E, and F to fail, that is, CCCi 2l = {B 2 , £2, F, } ; serious flooding in Phase 3 would cause C and G to fail, that is, CCCi, ! = {e), Ci) } . According to the available weather information, the following data should be able to be extracted: the probability of a hurricane occurring in Phase I is P. = 0.02 ; the probability of a lightning strike " "
time will be provided when needed.
A separable approach to incorporating CCF
We propose an efficient separable approach for incorporating the effects of CCF into the reliability evaluation of PMS in this section. Our methodology is to decompose an original PMS reliability problem with CCF into a number of reduced reliability problems based on the Total Probability Theorem. The set of reduced problems does not have to consider dependencies introduced by CCF, because the effects of CCF have been factored out. And the problems can be solved using the phase-modular approach [MESH03j. Finally, the results of all reduced reliability problems are aggregated to obtain the entire PMS reliability measure considering the CCF.
Specifically, based on our CCF model for PMS, there exist totally L elementary CC in a PMS. The L CC partition the event space into the following 2L disjoint subsets, each called a common-cause event (CCE): a , , , = (CC&,CCE, is equal to CCG3 because its corresponding elementary common-cause CC.7 occurs. For nonmaintainable PMS, because the system is not maintained during the mission, a component remains failed in all later phases once it fails. The CCG,, (i is the phase index in PMS, j is the CC index within phase i ) affected by an elementary common-cause CC;, occurring in some phase i should be expanded to incorporate the affected components in all subsequent phases i+l. ..., m. In addition, for dynamic PMS, if the trigger event of a FDEP gate is affected by an elementary CC in some phase i, then the related dependent events in the phase i and all subsequent phases should also be included into the corresponding CCG. We denote the expanded CCG as CCG; which will be used to find AccE, using similar procedure for non-PMS. For example, the expanded CCG for the example PMS are: We then build a space called "CCE space" over this set of collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive common-cause events that can occur in a PMS, that is, flea = {CCE"CCE" ... ,CCE,,}' If P(CCE)denotes the probability of CCE occurring, then we have """ P(CCE ) = I and CCE nCCE =¢ for any i '" j.
Consider the example PMS presented in the last subsection, the CCE space is composed of 2' = 8 CCE, that is, flca = {CCE" CCE" ... ,CCEsl, given that there are 3 elementary common-causes CCII (hurricanes), CC'I (lightning strikes), and CC 31 (floods). Each CCE i is a distinct and disjoint combination of elementary CC, as defined in the first column of Table 1 . Let AceE, denote a set of components, which are the only ones affected by the common-cause event CCE p In other words, the occurrence of event CCE i leads to the failure of all components and only those in ACCEJ . For non-PMS, ACCEJ is simply the union of those CCG whose corresponding elementary cormnon-causes occur [XING05j. For example, assume CCE, = CC, n CC, n CC, is a CCE in a non-PMS with three elementary CC, then ACCEJ is equal to CCG J because its corresponding elementary common-cause CC 3 occurs. For nOllmaintainable PMS, because the system is not maintained during the mission, a component remains failed in all later phases once it fails. The CCC u (i is the phase index in PMS, j is the CC index within phase i) affected by an elementary common-cause CC I ) occurring in some phase i should be expanded to incorporate the affected components in all subsequent phases i+ 1, ... , m. In addition, for dynamic PMS, if the trigger event ofa FDEP gate is affected by an elementary CC in some phase i, then the related dependent events in the phase i and all subsequent phases should also be included into the corresponding CCO. We denote the expanded CCo. as CCC· which will be " used to find A CCE , using similar procedure for non-PMS. For example, the expanded CCO. for the example PMS are: 
=8.82e-4 CCE, =
---- 
=3.6e-4
Consider the example PMS, the original PMS reliability problem with CCF can now be subdivided into eight reduced problems that need not consider CCF, Based on the system configuration depicted in figure I, we can derive that: Pr{PMS failslCCEJl ~ I for j ~ 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8; because no component is affected by Aca, which is ~,
Pr{PMS failsICCE]} can be obtained by evaluating the original PMS fault tree in figure I using the phase modular approach without considering CCF. The value of Pr{PMS failsICCE]} is 0.000682146 using the failure parameters in table 2. Finally according to Equation (I), the unreliability of the example PMS subject to CCF as 0.0785 for the mission time of200 hours is obtained by aggregating the results ofPr{PMS failslCCE j } and Pr(CCE,) ( 
AN EXAMPLE PMS SPACE MISSION SYSTEM
The fault tree of our example PMS space mission, given in Figure 3 , below, has been dra'WIl from data extracted from expert opinions about the possible risk clements of the Mars Smart Lander project (MSL-09). Note that the failure events considered here are a subset of the existing events that can contribute to a failure. The system characteristics are not fully shown here; rather, we consider a very simplified version for demonstration purposes only.
We consider a three-phased space mission that consists of the following phases: Launch; Cruise; and Entry, Descent, Landing (EDL). In the first two phases, the system can fail because of Radioactive Power Source (RPS) induced failures, such as thermal issues and radiation effects. During the launch phase, the system can also fail due to the launch vehicle failure. During the cruise phase, it can fail as a result of Optimal Navigation (OpNav) issues or Cruise stage related failures. During EDL, propulsion and avionics, thermal, and radiation issues as well as the failure of hazard detection and avoidance issues can lead to a system failure. The hazard detection and avoidance issues occur as a result of the failure of both the LIDAR and the RADAR. Each of the basic events connected directly to the top event are static modules. The RPS induced failure is a dynamic module.
Having established the phase and system fault trees as per step one of the phase-modular method, we then identify the system-level independent modules as per step two. Note that the only components present in all phases are Thermal Issues and Radiation Effects. In the first two phases, the RPS accommodation issues can lead to the occurrence of thermal issues and radiation effects; in the third phase, the only cause for the failure of each of them is their 0\\111 individual failure rates. This behavior leads us to group these components together in the dynamic phase module {RPS accommodation, Thermal Issues, Radiation Effects}. The basic events "launch vehicle," "Opnav system," "Cruise stage," "Avionics" and "Propulsion" are directly linked to the phase fault tree and do not overlap in any component. Therefore, they are phase independent static bottom level modules. "Hazard detection and avoidance" is an upper level parent module that consists of the basic events "LIDAR and "RADAR."
We then find the reliability of each module as per step 3. The only phase module that needs to be solved using combined Markov chain approach is the module {RPS accommodation, Thermal issues, Radiation Effects). We solve this module in each phase. The reliability measure of this module at each phase level is obtained and input to the higher level system fault tree. The upper level module, "Hazard detection and avoidance," is also solved for the duration of phase three, and its reliability measure is input to the higher level fault tree.
At this point, each of the phase modules are considered a basic event with a failure rate equal to their reliability measures in the given phase. The reliability of the overall system fault tree is then found using a combined static approach as per step four.
Using the approach mentioned above, and the failure rates in 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We presented a separable approach to incorporate the effects of dependent CCF into the reliability analysis of general PMS consisting of both static and dynamic phases. The approach decomposes the original reliability problem into a number of reduced reliability problems according to Total Probability Theorem. The CCF effects are factored out through reduction. As compared with non-PMS, an expansion on the CCG is needed to include the nonmaintainable effects; as compared with static PMS, a special treatment is needed to incorporate the dependent events of a FDEP gate into CCG when the trigger event of the FDEP gate is affected by some CC. Also, the separable approach enables the analysis of multiple CC that can affect multiple components from different phases, and which may be s-dependent. We illustrate the separable phase-modular approach by considering the reliability modeling and analysis of a PMS subject to three CC in three different phases and also show how the approach can be applied to analyze a space mission system.
Out next research tasks include the validation of the separable phase-modular approach, quantifying how effective it is by comparing it in complexity and results with other approaches to analyzing and modeling CCF.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The research described in this paper was partially carried out at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, under a contract with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. References herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not constitute or imply its endorsement by the United States Government or the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology. system," "Cruise stage," "Avionics" and "Propulsion" are directly linked to the phase fault tree and do not overlap in any component. Therefore, they are phase independent static bottom level modules. "Hazard detection and avoidance" is an upper level parent module that consists of the basic events "LIDAR" and "RADAR. II We then find the reliability of each module as per step 3. The only phase module that needs to be solved using combined Markov chain approach is the module {RPS accommodation, Thennal issues, Radiation Effects}. We solve this module in each phase. The reliability measure of this module at each phase level is obtained and input to the higher level system fault tree. The upper level module, "Hazard detection and avoidance," is also solved for the duration of phase three, and its reliability measure is input to the higher level fault tree.
At this point, each of the phase modules are considered a basic event with a failure rate equal to their reliability measures in the given phase. The reliability of the overall system fault tree is then found using a combined static approach as per step four. Using the approach mentioned above, and the failure rates in table 3, we obtain an unreliability of 0.0121508 for this example.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We presented a separable approach to incorporate the effects of dependent CCF into the reliability analysis of general PMS consisting of both static and dynamic phases. The approach decomposes the original reliability problem into a number of reduced reliability problems according to Total Probability Theorem. The CCF effects are factored out through reduction. As compared with non-PMS, an expansion on the CCG is needed to include the nonmaintainable effects; as compared with static PMS, a special treatment is needed to incorporate the dependent events of a FDEP gate into CCG when the trigger event of the FDEP gate is affected by some Cc. Also, the separable approach enables the analysis of multiple CC that can affect multiple components from different phases, and which may be s-dependent. We illustrate the separable phase-modular approach by considering the reliability modeling and analysis of a PMS subject to three CC in three different phases and also show how the approach can be applied to analyze a space mission system. Out next research tasks include the validation of the separable phase-modular approach, quantifying how effective it is by comparing it in complexity and results with other approaches to analyzing and modeling CCF.
